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#### On/for energy production is an adjective phrase

**Megginson, 2007** (David Megginson, University of Ottawa, Department of English, “The Function Of Phrases” writingcentre.uottawa.ca/hypergrammar/phrfunc.html)

An adjective phrase is any phrase which modifies a noun or pronoun. You often construct adjective phrases using participles or prepositions together with their objects: I was driven mad by the sound of my neighbour's constant piano practising. In this sentence, the prepositional phrase "of my neighbour's constant piano practising" acts as an adjective modifying the noun "sound."

#### ‘On’ means energy production IS THE OPERATIVE CAUSE OF financial incentives

OED 89 Oxford English Dictionary v3 2nd Ed for (FBT(r),fe(r)), prep, and conj. Also 2 fer, 3 south, vor, Orm. forr..

22. Of an efficient or operative cause: In consequence of, by reason of, as the effect of. (Now chiefly after comparatives; otherwise usu. replaced by from, of, through.) Also in for want of: see W A N T. 111; LAY. 27818

Efficient cause (Wikipedia) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four\_causes#Efficient\_cause

The "efficient cause" of an object is equivalent to that which causes change and motion to start or stop (such as a painter painting a house) (see Aristotle, Physics II 3, 194b29). In many cases, this is simply the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away which transforms a block of marble into a statue. This is the cause of change, and as such is commonly used in modern conceptions of change, as well as cause-and-effect.[citation needed]

### 2NC Limits

#### Depth outweighs breadth – studies overwhelmingly vote neg – key to education

TPC (Texas Panhandle P-16 Council, Texas-based group of teachers and educators from across the state) 2010 “Breadth vs. Depth of High School Curriculum Content” http://www.panhandlep-16.net/users/0001/docs/Position%20Paper2.pdf

Less breadth and more depth in curriculum better prepares students for future careers and education. This is the position of over one hundred faculty assembled in the Texas Panhandle, and it is also the conclusion of many scholarly studies reviewed for this paper. In fact, there are far too many studies to cite in this paper, so only a few representative studies are used. In a 2008 study entitled “Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Science Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework”1 the researchers noted: “In a comparison of 46 countries, Schmidt et al. (2005) noted that in top-achieving countries, the science frameworks cover far fewer topics than in the United States, and that students from these countries perform significantly better than students in the United States. They conclude that U.S. standards are not likely to create a framework that develops a deeper understanding of the structure of the discipline. By international standards, the U.S. science framework is „unfocused, repetitive, and undemanding‟”. The study went on to say that “the baseline model reveals a direct and compelling outcome: teaching for depth is associated with improvements in later performance”.

#### We can quantify it – literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

### Critique

#### Demands on the state reinforce state power – only the alternative of individual action solves

Brian Martin 1990 “uprooting war” http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html

The obvious point is that most social activists look constantly to the state for solutions to social problems. This point bears labouring, because the orientation of most social action groups tends to reinforce state power. This applies to most antiwar action too. Many of the goals and methods of peace movements have been oriented around action by the state, such as appealing to state elites and advocating neutralism and unilateralism. Indeed, peace movements spend a lot of effort debating which demand to make on the state: nuclear freeze, unilateral or multilateral disarmament, nuclear-free zones, or removal of military bases. By appealing to the state, activists indirectly strengthen the roots of many social problems, the problem of war in particular. To help transform the state system, action groups need to develop strategies which, at a minimum, do not reinforce state power. This means ending the incessant appeals for state intervention, and promoting solutions to social problems which strengthen local self-reliance and initiative. What can be done about poverty? Promote worker and community control over economic resources, and local self-reliance in skills and resources. What about racial discrimination? Promote discussion, interaction and nonviolent action at a grassroots level. What about environmental degradation? Encourage local communities to re-examine their own activities and to confront damaging practices. What about sexual discrimination? Build grassroots campaigns against rape and the gender division of labour, and mount challenges to hierarchical structures which help sustain patriarchy. What about corporate irresponsibility or excess profits? Promote worker and community control over production. What about unemployment? Promote community control of community resources for equitable distribution of work and the economic product, and develop worker cooperatives as an alternative to jobs as gifts of employers. What about crime? Work against unequal power and privilege, and for meaningful ways of living, to undercut the motivation for crime, and promote local community solidarity as a defence against crime. What about enemy attack? Social defence. What about too much military spending? Build local alternatives to the state, use these alternatives to withdraw support from the state and undermine the economic foundation of military spending. These grassroots, self-managing solutions to social problems are in many cases no more than suggestive directions. Detailed grassroots strategies in most cases have not been developed, partly because so little attention has been devoted to them compared to strategies relying on state intervention. But the direction should be clear: in developing strategies to address social problems, aim at building local self-reliance and withdrawing support from the state rather than appealing for state intervention and thereby reinforcing state power. Many people's thinking is permeated by state perspectives. One manifestation of this is the unstated identification of states or governments with the people in a country which is embodied in the words 'we' or 'us.' "We must negotiate sound disarmament treaties." "We must renounce first use of nuclear weapons." Those who make such statements implicitly identify with the state or government in question. It is important to avoid this identification, and to carefully distinguish states from people. The Italian state is different from the people living in Italy. Instead of saying "China invaded Vietnam," it is more accurate and revealing to say something like "Chinese military forces invaded Vietnamese territory" or perhaps "Chinese military forces, mostly conscripts, were ordered by the rulers of the Chinese state to invade territory which was claimed by rulers of the Vietnamese state as exclusively theirs to control." Also to be avoided is the attribution of gender to states, as in 'motherland' or 'fatherland.'Many social action campaigns have a national focus, a national organisational basis and depend on national activist leaders. This is especially true when the campaign is based on influencing state elites to implement or change policies. This national orientation both reflects and reinforces a state perspective and state power. The alternative is to think and act both locally and transnationally, and to develop skills and leadership at local levels. This approach has been adopted by some social movements, but seldom on a sustained and systematic basis.

#### Our hands are not on the levers of power. The Aff use of state fiat embodies a flawed methodology of centralization. The assumption that we as individuals have some sway over political decision making in centralized society gives credence to the lie that allows massive structures of government to strip villages and individuals of any modicum of control.

John **Papworth** May 14, **2007** "People’s Power for Peace" <http://gandhifoundation.org/2007/05/14/people%e2%80%99s-power-for-peace-by-john-papworth/>

The Mahatma was not opposed to technology, was not his spinning wheel one example of it? But he wanted people to use and control technology for the supreme moral ends of human betterment; he did not want technology to use people for ends that were merely mercenary and of benefit only to a minority. He saw khadi and other village industries as not simply a mean of relieving village poverty and making life decent and tolerable for millions, he saw it as a means of enhancing village power and reducing state power, so that village moral options would play their own part in the political process. It is one of the great tragedies of the 20th century that the significance of this aspect of his teaching has been almost completely overlooked by those who have sought to promote change under the banner of ‘peace’. They have made the error of assuming that in human affairs the shortest distance between two points is a straight line: that peace could be achieved with knee- jerk reactions to any moves towards war made by governments, that if only enough people would read enough peace literature, join enough peace organisations, attend enough peace conferences and peace rallies, even if they were only talking and meeting with each other, one day, somehow or other, ‘peace’ would prevail. One reason for this confusion arises from our readiness to accept that because each of us has a vote perhaps half a dozen times in a lifetime, that gives us control of the giant machinery of political power and that we are thereby entitled to assume it is our moral options which prevail and that our form of government is therefore democratic. This is one of the most momentous illusions of the modern era and has done more to destroy the effectiveness of the peace movement than any other factor. The meaning of the word ‘democracy’ is based on the concept that people control the power of government, what prevails today is the exact opposite; it is the power of government which now controls people. The reason for this stems from our failure to see the force of Aristotle’s remark: “To the size of a state there is a limit, as there is to plants, animals, and implements for none of these retain their natural facility when they are too large”. Rousseau made much the same point: The more the state is enlarged the more freedom is diminished. It is an illusion based on a failure to absorb the elementary arithmetic of power; that the smaller the political unit the bigger the significance of the individual member, contrawise the larger the political unit the smaller the significance of the individual: so that, for example, a unit of just two persons, each having the right to vote of course, means that each person has one half of the power: a unit of 100 means each has one hundredth, a million yields a one millionth. The UK has around 50 million voters, and if one 50 millionth of the share of governing power may give cause for discontent just think of the luckless inhabitant of the democratic Chinese paradise enjoying about one and a third billionth of power! Why do these numbers matter? Because as the size of the unit increases and the power of the individual diminishes, where then does the power go? The answer is, to the centre. The mere factor of growth itself transfers power from the individual to central government, and the bigger the unit the more power the centre is able to wield. But, a voice will object, the people control the government with their votes. It is a theoretical objection based on an illusion. The voters may elect the persons who govern, but on a mass scale is quite unable to control what they do. This is why we are in the midst of the greatest crisis of civilisation that has confronted humanity in all its history, for once in power the leaders control policy decisions, they control appointments, patronage, the power to influence the media, taxation, foreign relations, the power to make war, even the power to destroy the country’s very identity by submerging it in a federation of other mass powers. The voters may be aghast at what is happening, but on a mass scale all they can do is to vote into power another mass party leadership of different personalities which will tend to have almost identical policies.

#### Reject top down solutions only individual and community level action can resolve the centralization crisis.

Cael Smith 2011, (founder and research director for the Renewable Communities Alliance, and a founding member of Solar Done Right, MSci in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology and BA in Environmental Policy. 09-07-2011. http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/09/monopoly-energy-or-energy-democracy

Maybe it was the report from California that declared large solar lease investors are making an aggressive grab for Governor Brown's groundbreaking 12,000 MW of distributed generation in CA. Or it could have been an insider’s comment that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is (once again) under explosive pressure to auction off Colorado's few untouched public lands for oil and gas leasing. Perhaps it was Secretary of Interior Salazar's push to open 22 million acres of ecologically valuable public land for industrial solar development. Or maybe it was [watching this hilarious, but tragically revealing, 2010 Daily Show](http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-june-16-2010/an-energy-independent-future?xrs=share_fb" \t "_blank) where Jon Stewart reminds us that our last eight Presidents have vowed, and failed in various degrees, to achieve energy independence and end our dependency on fossil fuels. More likely, the State department [approval](http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/08/26/305591/ignoring-climate-change-state-department-report-concludes-keystone-xl-has-no-significant-impacts/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) of the Keystone 1 tar sands pipeline, was the final straw. In any case, I am staring at the hard truth — we local, distributed clean energy advocates, climate and anti-frack/fossil fuel activists, and regular folks who just want affordable clean energy are losing. But it's worse than that. Our pocketbooks, planet, public safety and welfare have been hijacked as we are forced to depend on increasingly destructive and dirty energy sources. It's been a discouraging year, especially when measured against the encouraging gains made by the rest of the world. The economy in [Ontario, Canada](http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/feed-in-tariffs-ontarios-experience/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) is bursting with clean energy generation and jobs. Germany has maintained its global lead in solar energy while pushing to go [beyond nuclear](http://www.grist.org/article/2011-07-24-germany-passes-new-renewable-energy-law-for-2012%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) (despite being downplayed in the U.S.). [Japan](http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/08/japan-approves-national-feed-in-tariff%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) has adopted a new feed-in tariff (FIT) designed to spur 30,000 MW of renewable energy by 2020. (FIT's are unequivocally the most effective policy incentive for renewable energy.) The U.S. is dragging desperately behind in the global race to keep climate change in check. At this point ([392.39 ppm and counting](http://co2now.org/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)), it demands no less than a complete and immediate transformation of our global energy system. Adding insult to injury, we are even losing hard fought ground. Colorado's pioneer Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing program continues to be derailed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Xcel's abrupt and steep reduction in Solar\*Rewards has cost Colorado thousands of good, green jobs. And even a very modest FIT study bill didn't make it past first base in the state legislature earlier this year. While there have been a few hard-earned gains, like solar permitting reform legislation, financing remains chronically anemic in most of the U.S. In contrast, "monopoly energy" is moving full-throttle ahead. Massive new natural gas, oil and industrial wind and solar "plays" are being staked out by industries across the nation. Many are in areas that had been spared from destructive energy development, like [Huerfano County](http://huerfanofrack.blogspot.com/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in southern Colorado. After decades of secrecy, exemption and billions in taxpayer subsidies, we are just beginning to understand the [true cost](http://priceofoil.org/thepriceofoil/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) of monopoly energy in our communities, public health and environment. And to make matters worse, when developed under the central, industrial energy model, even renewable energy sources like [wind](http://realwindinfoforme.com/wind-groups/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) and [solar](http://www.basinandrangewatch.org/IvanpahValley.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) take on the same destructive qualities. Monopoly energy continues to reap [record profits](http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2011/04/oil_company_pro.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) while [failing miserably](http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/case/arkansas-residents-earthquake-class-action-bhp.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) to protect our health and environment. Public cries grow stronger and demonstrations grow larger and longer. Yet, our dutifully elected deciders routinely shove our environmental laws aside and widen the path for unpopular and dangerous big energy projects at the bidding of monopoly energy. All of this leads to the painfully obvious question: Why have we as a nation failed to move ahead to achieve [wildly popular](http://coloradoindependent.com/97169/survey-says-coloradans-are-fed-up-with-oil-companies-want-more-renewables%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) (and democratic) local clean energy goals more than 40 years after we recognized the need? Germany's solar champion [Hermann Scheer](http://www.hermannscheer.de/en/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) offered this answer in an [interview](http://www.democracynow.org/2010/10/15/hermann_scheer_1944_2010_german_lawmaker%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) with Amy Goodman on [Democracy Now!](http://www.democracynow.org/2010/10/15/hermann_scheer_1944_2010_german_lawmaker%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) shortly before his death: “We’re in a race between centralized and decentralized, energy monopoly and energy democracy. The mobilization of society is most important and once people realize they can’t wait for the government or utilities, but can do it themselves, it will change." Most importantly, Scheer said, "people need to act to overcome administrative and bureaucratic barriers that hinder renewable energy. The rules favoring conventional energy and blocking decentralized renewable energy need to be exposed and dismantled.” Japan has learned the same lesson, albeit far more painfully than Germany. In a recent [report](http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/Japan/JapanFeed-inTariffPolicyBecomesLaw.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) by Paul Gipe on Japan's recent adoption of a feed-in tariff, designed to spur more than 30,000 MW of renewable energy by 2020, he pointed out: Observers say a key feature of the new law is the creation of a special parliamentary committee to determine the details of the program, including specific tariffs. In the past, this function would normally have been assigned to the powerful [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Economy%2C_Trade_and_Industry%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) (METI). However, the political fallout from the nuclear disaster at Fukishima has led to a dramatic loss of trust in METI, which has opposed both the rapid expansion of renewables, and also the use of feed-in tariffs to do so. Taking program design and pricing away from METI is a major victory for renewable energy advocates in Japan. Like METI in Japan, monopoly energy (including the utility industry) devoutly opposes progressive renewable energy policies that will decentralize and democratize energy systems in the U.S. A major player in the [Corporatocracy](http://www.alternet.org/economy/151018/10_steps_to_defeat_the_corporatocracy/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), monopoly energy has captured the White House and most of Congress, dominates state energy politics and in many cases, even controls local agendas. Until people unite with the understanding that monopoly energy's strangle-hold on our society and resources must be directly challenged and dismantled, as it was in Germany and now Japan, we will continue to expect unrealistic outcomes, bend our expectations to the needs of power, and fall farther behind as the rest of the world transitions to clean energy.

#### Alt spills up and solves the aff

Jayan Nayar 1999 (professor of law at the university of warwick) “orders of inhumanity” fall, p. lexis

we are today bombarded by images of our "one world." we speak of the world as "shrinking" into a "global village." we are not all fooled by the implicit benign-ness of this image of "time-space" contracted--so we also speak of "global pillage." this astuteness of our perceptions, however, does not prevent us from our delusion of the "global;" the image of the "global" world persists even for many activists amongst us who struggle to "change" the world. this is recent delusion. it is a delusion which anesthetizes us from the only world which we can ever locate ourselves in and know--the worlds of "I"-in relationships. the "I" is seldom present in "emancipatory" projects to change the world. this is because the "relational i"-world and the "global"-world are negations of one another; the former negates the concept of the latter whilst the latter negates the life of the former. and concepts are more amenable to scrutiny than life. the advance in technologies of image-ing enables a distanciation of scrutiny, from the "i"-world of relationships to the "global"-world of abstractions. as we become fixated with the distant, as we consume the images of "world" as other than here and now, as we project ourselves through technological time-space into worlds apart from our here and now, as we become "global," we are relieved of the gravity of our present. we, thus, cease the activism of self (being) and take on the mantle of the "activist" (doing). this is a significant displacement. that there is suffering all over the world has indeed been made more visible by the technologies of image-ing. yet for all its consequent fostering of "networks," images of "global" suffering have also served to disempower. by this, we mean not merely that we are filled with the sense that the forces against which the struggle for emancipations from injustice and exploitation are waged are pervasive and, therefore, often impenetrable, but, more importantly, that it diverts our gaze away from the only true power that is in our disposal--the power of self-change in relationships of solidarities. the "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. it does not exist today. there is no such thing as the global "one world." the world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. it is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out there, [\*630] it only exists in relationship. to say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. there can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence. changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed. and the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. and the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "i" of all of us. and so, to change our relationships, we must change the "i" that is each of us. transformations of "structures" will soon follow. this is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. this is, perhaps, the essential message of mahatmas.

### Contention 1

#### We should evaluate actions by their managerial consequences - rolling back the steady evolution toward multilateral world peace should be avoided

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm Gwynne **Dyer** December 30, 200**4** is a Canadian journalist based in London whose articles are published in 45 papers worldwide. This is an abridged version of the last chapter in his updated book, War, first published in 1985. His latest book is Future: Tense. The Coming Global Order, published by McClelland and Stewart. by the Toronto Star The End of War Our Task Over the Next Few Years is to Transform the World of Independent States into a Genuine Global Village by Gwynne Dyer

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system. The solution to the state of international anarchy that compels every state to arm itself for war was so obvious that it arose almost spontaneously in 1918. The wars by which independent states had always settled their quarrels in the past had grown so monstrously destructive that some alternative system had to be devised, and that could only be a pooling of sovereignty, at least in matters concerning war and peace, by all the states of the world. So the victors of World War I promptly created the League of Nations. But the solution was as difficult in practice as it was simple in concept. Every member of the League of Nations understood that if the organization somehow acquired the ability to act in a concerted and effective fashion, it could end up being used against them, so no major government was willing to give the League of Nations any real power. Instead, they got World War II, and that war was so bad — by the end the first nuclear weapons had been used on cities — that the victors made a second attempt in 1945 to create an international organization that really could prevent war. They literally changed international law and made war illegal, but they were well aware that all of that history and all those reflexes were not going to vanish overnight. It would be depressing to catalogue the many failures of the United Nations, but it would also be misleading. The implication would be that this was an enterprise that should have succeeded from the start, and has failed irrevocably. On the contrary; it was bound to be a relative failure at the outset. It was always going to be very hard to persuade sovereign governments to surrender power to an untried world authority which might then make decisions that went against their particular interests. In the words of the traditional Irish directions to a lost traveler: "If that's where you want to get to, sir, I wouldn't start from here." But here is where we must start from, for it is states that run the world. The present international system, based on heavily armed and jealously independent states, often exaggerates the conflicts between the multitude of human communities in the world, but it does reflect an underlying reality: We cannot all get all we want, and some method must exist to decide who gets what. That is why neighboring states have lived in a perpetual state of potential war, just as neighboring hunter-gatherer bands did 20,000 years ago. If we now must abandon war as a method of settling our disputes and devise an alternative, it only can be done with the full co-operation of the world's governments. That means it certainly will be a monumentally difficult and lengthy task: Mistrust reigns everywhere and no nation will allow even the least of its interests to be decided upon by a collection of foreigners. Even the majority of states that are more or less satisfied with their borders and their status in the world would face huge internal opposition from nationalist elements to any transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. The good news for humans is that it looks like peaceful conditions, once established, can be maintained. And if baboons can do it, why not us? The U.N. as presently constituted is certainly no place for idealists, but they would feel even more uncomfortable in a United Nations that actually worked as was originally intended. It is an association of poachers turned game-keepers, not an assembly of saints, and it would not make its decisions according to some impartial standard of justice. There is no impartial concept of justice to which all of mankind would subscribe and, in any case, it is not "mankind" that makes decisions at the United Nations, but governments with their own national interests to protect. To envision how a functioning world authority might reach its decisions, at least in its first century or so, begin with the arrogant promotion of self-interest by the great powers that would continue to dominate U.N. decision-making and add in the crass expediency masquerading as principle that characterizes the shifting coalitions among the lesser powers in the present General Assembly: It would be an intensely political process. The decisions it produced would be kept within reasonable bounds only by the need never to act in a way so damaging to the interest of any major member or group of members that it forced them into total defiance, and so destroyed the fundamental consensus that keeps war at bay. There is nothing shocking about this. National politics in every country operates with the same combination: a little bit of principle, a lot of power, and a final constraint on the ruthless exercise of that power based mainly on the need to preserve the essential consensus on which the nation is founded and to avoid civil war. In an international organization whose members represent such radically different traditions, interests, and levels of development, the proportion of principle to power is bound to be even lower. It's a pity that there is no practical alternative to the United Nations, but there isn't. If the abolition of great-power war and the establishment of international law is truly a hundred-year project, then we are running a bit behind schedule but we have made substantial progress. We have not had World War III, and that is thanks at least in part to the United Nations, which gave the great powers an excuse to back off from several of their most dangerous confrontations without losing face. No great power has fought another since 1945, and the wars that have broken out between middle-sized powers from time to time — Arab-Israeli wars and Indo-Pakistani wars, mostly — seldom lasted more than a month, because the U.N.'s offers of ceasefires and peacekeeping troops offered a quick way out for the losing side. If you assessed the progress that has been made since 1945 from the perspective of that terrifying time, the glass would look at least half-full. The enormous growth of international organizations since 1945, and especially the survival of the United Nations as a permanent forum where the states of the world are committed to avoiding war (and often succeed), has already created a context new to history. The present political fragmentation of the world into more than 150 stubbornly independent territorial units will doubtless persist for a good while to come. But it is already becoming an anachronism, for, in every other context, from commerce, technology, and the mass media to fashions in ideology, music, and marriage, the outlines of a single global culture (with wide local variations) are visibly taking shape. It is very likely that we began our career as a rising young species by exterminating our nearest relatives, the Neanderthals, and it is entirely possible we will end it by exterminating ourselves, but the fact that we have always had war as part of our culture does not mean that we are doomed always to fight wars. Other aspects of our behavioral repertoire are a good deal more encouraging. There is, for example, a slow but quite perceptible revolution in human consciousness taking place: the last of the great redefinitions of humanity. At all times in our history, we have run our affairs on the assumption that there is a special category

of people (our lot) whom we regard as full human beings, having rights and duties approximately equal to our own, and whom we ought not to kill even when we quarrel. Over the past 15,000 or 20,000 years we have successively widened this category from the original hunting-and-gathering band to encompass larger and larger groups. First it was the tribe of some thousands of people bound together by kinship and ritual ties; then the state, where we recognize our shared interests with millions of people whom we don't know and will never meet; and now, finally, the entire human race. There was nothing in the least idealistic or sentimental in any of the previous redefinitions. They occurred because they were useful in advancing people's material interests and ensuring their survival. The same is true for this final act of redefinition: We have reached a point where our moral imagination must expand again to embrace the whole of mankind. It's no coincidence that the period in which the concept of the national state is finally coming under challenge by a wider definition of humanity is also the period that has seen history's most catastrophic wars, for they provide the practical incentive for change. But the transition to a different system is a risky business: The danger of another world war which would cut the whole process short is tiny in any given year, but cumulatively, given how long the process of change will take, it is extreme. That is no reason not to keep trying. Our task over the next few generations is to transform the world of independent states in which we live into some sort of genuine international community. If we succeed in creating that community, however quarrelsome, discontented, and full of injustice it will probably be, then we shall effectively have abolished the ancient institution of warfare. Good riddance.

#### Move toward the local is impossible- our adaptive nature ensures that we can resolve global problems but only if we think about them

Barnhizer, 6 David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

Grand utopian visions, and even smaller utopias based on an ideal of pastoral communities harmoniously husbanding local resources, simply are not reflective of the reality faced by the vast majority of people. E.F. Schumacher's argument that "small is beautiful" may appear to be an elegant solution for how we can all live comfortable and rewarding lives within enriching community bonds, but it is not going to happen. 56 "Small is beautiful" has become an impossible dream for all but a few communities. The process of impossibility is driven by population growth, the breakdown of local communities through migration, the infusion of multicultural diversity, and a materialistic ethos that has altered our sense of what constitutes [\*619] quality of life. The most obvious driving forces include increasing urban densities and coastal development requiring massive infrastructures and supportive supply systems, overall population levels, and the distortions of population distribution and age demographics. To these can be added quality of life demands caused by people in economically impoverished countries who can see how material life is led in richer countries and the spread of interdependent economic systems that allow global production and distribution systems to penetrate what had been largely closed economic and cultural systems. These conditions are not reversible. My concern here is related to the speed at which societies are approaching various kinds of large-scale dislocations, injustices, strife, and even disaster. I do not want to resort to doomsday prophecies or set a clear date on which critical resources will be irreversibly depleted, such as was done in the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth report in 1972. 57 In addition to being destructive and careless, humans are also adaptive and resilient. Placing hard and fast deadlines on when chaos occurs and the worst effects are generated is unwise and chancy at best. 58 But if it is unwise or at least extremely difficult to make accurate and detailed predictions involving "doom and gloom" scenarios, it is equally unwise and foolhardy to ignore that the equivalent of ecological and social tectonic plates with massive disruptive potential are shifting underneath the surface of our national and global systems. Failing to prepare for the most likely consequences reaches the level of gross irresponsibility. We face a combination of ecological, social, and economic crises. These crises involve the ability to fund potentially conflicting obligations for the provision of social benefits, health care, education, pensions, and poverty alleviation. They also include the need for massive expenditures to "fix" what we have already broken. 59 Part of the challenge is that in the United States and Europe we have made fiscal promises that we cannot keep. We also have vast economic needs for [\*620] continuing wealth generation as a precondition for achieving social equity on national and global levels. Figuring out how to reduce some of those obligations, eliminate others, and rebuild the core and vitality of our system must become a part of any honest social discourse. Even Pollyanna would be overwhelmed by the choices we face. There will be significant pain and sacrifice in any action we take. But failing to take prompt and effective action will produce even more catastrophic consequences.

#### Massive transition wars to localized communities

Barnhizer, 6 David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. 60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior. Many developing country groups involved in efforts to protect the environment and resist the impacts of free trade on their communities have been concerned with the harmful effects of economic change. Part of the concern is the increased scale of economic activity. Some concerns relate to who benefits and who loses in the changing context imposed by globalization. These concerns are legitimate and understandable. So are the other deep currents running beneath their political positions, including those of resistance to change of any kind and a [\*621] rejection of the market approach to economic activities. In the system described inaccurately as free market capitalism, economic activity not only breaks down existing systems, it creates new systems and--as Joseph Schumpeter observed--continually repeats the process through cycles of "creative destruction." 61 This pattern of creative destruction unfolds as necessarily and relentlessly as does the birth-maturation-death-rebirth cycle of the natural environment. This occurs even in a self-sufficient or autarkic market system capable of managing all variables within its closed dominion. But when the system breaks out of its closed environment, the ability of a single national actor to control the system's dynamics erodes and ultimately disappears in the face of differential conditions, needs, priorities, and agendas. Globalization's ability to produce wealth for a particular group simultaneously produces harms to different people and interests and generates unfair resource redistribution within existing cultures. This is an unavoidable consequence of globalization. 62 The problem is that globalization has altered the rules of operation of political, economic, and social activities, and in doing so multiplied greatly our ability to create benefit and harm. 63 While some understandably want the unsettling and often chaotic effects of globalization to go away, it can only be dealt with, not reversed. The system in which we live and work is no longer closed. There are few contexts not connected to the dynamics of some aspect of the extended economic and social systems resulting from globalization. This means the wide ranging and incompatible variables of a global economic, human rights, and social fairness system are resulting in conflicts and unanticipated interpenetrations that no one fully understands, anticipates, or controls. 64 Local [\*622] self-sufficiency is the loser in this process. It can remain a nostalgic dream but rarely a reality. Except for isolated cultures and niche activities, there is very little chance that anyone will be unaffected by this transformational process. Change is the constant, and it will take several generations before we return to a period of relative stasis. Even then it will only be a respite before the pattern once again intensifies.

### Contention 2

#### Predictions are good – they are key to prevent catastrophic violence even if they are inaccurate

Fuyuki Kurasawa Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004 Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

#### Planning for uncertain events is good- mere speculation ensures that we only speculate on things that we already agree with

Michael **Fitzsimmons 2007** [survival, vol 48, no 4, p.139]

Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that 'many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain'. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that 'what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.'34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining 'a standard of judgment' from 'knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense'. Scientific inquiry into the 'laws of probability' for any given strategic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, **analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers**. Nevertheless, Clausewitz's implication seems to be that **the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning**. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others' presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not 'what is your inferred causation, General?' Above all, not, 'what are your values, Mr. Secretary?'… If someone says 'a fair chance'… ask, 'if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?' If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences… Once differing odds have been quoted, the question 'why?' can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert's basis for linking 'if' with 'then' gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.'35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strategic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May's point - prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers' beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker's sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than undermines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in planning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the distinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome - that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. \* \* \* One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relationship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz's work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tendencies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational implications, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but **assumptions must be made in the end**. Clausewitz's 'standard of judgment' for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future